The political liability in the Jordanian political system: A comparative study Gaining and Withdrawing Confidence after the 2011

Abstract

The parliamentary system is considered a democratic system. Indeed, it is based on the isolation principle, with its correct concept of cooperation and balance between authorities.

In Jordan, this system was more evident in the Constitution of the Kingdom in 1952, as compared to the two previous constitutions where the parliamentary system was described as incomplete due to not including the political liability of the ministry before the elected House of Representatives-the liability in those two constitutions was before the prince in 1928, and before the king in 1946.

This study aims to demonstrate the constitutional amendments in 2011 concerning political liability, particularly with regard to confirming it, where the mechanism of voting for trust was cited in sections 1 and 2, stating that trust in ministry or one of the ministers is performed before the House of Representatives. However, if the elected council did not vote for the trust of the majority of its members, those members should resign. This shows that voting is correct but not positive, as the members voted for no trust in the ministry. This contradicts the content of section 6 of the pre-mentioned article, where voting takes place positively so that the government has the trust for the ministerial statement.

This study analyzes this issue and show its effect on the government and the minister, as well as its consequences. The study concludes with some recommendations, including the necessity of amending article (45) to standardize and demonstrate giving trust based on one mechanism, where the correct positive voting is recommended. The study also recommended standardizing the effects on the government and the minister, where the minister- as an individual liability- also resigns.